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“A DOLLAR AIN’T MUCH IF YOU’VE GOT IT”*:
FREEING MODERN-DAY POLL TAXES FROM

ANDERSON-BURDICK
Lydia Saltzbart**
“Wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting
qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”
– Justice Douglas, Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
How much should it cost to vote in the United States? The answer is
clear from the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections—nothing. Yet more than fifty
years later, many U.S. voters must jump over financial hurdles to
access the franchise. These hurdles have withstood judicial review
because the Court has drifted away from Harper and has instead
applied the more deferential Anderson-Burdick analysis to modern
poll tax claims—requiring voters to demonstrate how severely the
cost burdens them. As a result, direct and indirect financial burdens
on the vote have proliferated. Millions of voters are required to
expend financial resources to provide postage for mail ballots,
comply with voter ID requirements, notarize ballots, and pay off
*

During post-Reconstruction, a Georgia woman, when asked her thoughts on the
poll tax, replied “[a] dollar ain’t much if you’ve got it.” Ryan A. Partelow, The
Twenty-First Century Poll Tax, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425, 431 (2020)
**
J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2022. B.A., Wellesley College, 2015. I
would like to thank my parents, Karen and Phil Saltzbart, and my sister Phoebe
for their unwavering faith and encouragement. Thanks to Professors Susan
Herman and Wilfred Codrington III for their advice and support during the writing
process, and to the Journal of Law and Policy staff for their hard work and
diligence. This Note is dedicated to all of the organizers and volunteers who work
to make our democracy stronger. All errors and omissions are my own.
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legal financial obligations (“LFOs”) in order to vote and have their
vote counted. This Note argues that the Court fails to appreciate the
special constitutional and statutory protections against wealthbased voting qualifications when it applies Anderson-Burdick to
monetary burdens on the right to vote. In highlighting the specific
protections afforded by Harper, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,
and Section 10 of the Voting Rights Act, this Note calls for not only
the Court, but also Congress, to restore the intended power of these
protections and to untangle laws that impose monetary burdens on
voters from ordinary voting regulations subject to AndersonBurdick.
INTRODUCTION
In its 1966 decision, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,
the United States Supreme Court unequivocally declared that a poll
tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas announced
that a state law is inconsistent with Equal Protection “whenever it
makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard.”2 Put simply, the Court found that “[v]oter qualifications
have no relation to wealth.”3
With the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment shortly
before Harper, Congress and thirty-eight states sought to abolish
financial barriers to the ballot.4 In Harper, the Court approved of the
Amendment’s intent and expanded its reach, holding that
conditioning a voter’s ability to cast a ballot on her wealth violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Yet more than fifty years after Douglas penned the decision in
Harper, many voters in the United States must still jump over
financial hurdles to access the franchise.6 Some of these financial
1

Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Ryan A. Partelow, The Twenty-First Century Poll Tax, 47 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 425, 434–37 (2020).
5
Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
6
See CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., CAN’T PAY, CAN’T VOTE: A NATIONAL
SURVEY ON THE MODERN POLL TAX 19–33 (2019), https://campaignlegal.org
2
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barriers, often called modern-day or de facto poll taxes, include:
voter ID requirements;7 voter-provided postage for mail ballots;8
lost wages due to long lines to vote;9 requiring absentee voters to
notarize their ballots10 and permitting notaries to charge fees for
ballot notarization;11 and conditioning re-enfranchisement of
convicted felons upon payment of all legal financial obligations
(“LFOs”).12
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has recently been unwilling
to recognize the serious constitutional problems these de facto poll
taxes present. In 2008, it decided Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, in which it failed to follow Harper and instead
analyzed the financial burdens placed on voters under the AndersonBurdick balancing test,13 a more deferential sliding-scale standard
that evaluates whether a state election regulation impermissibly
burdens the right to vote by weighing the burden against the state’s
interests.14
The Court fails to appreciate special protections against wealthbased voting qualifications when it applies Anderson-Burdick to
monetary burdens on the right to vote. A financial barrier to the
/document/cant-pay-cant-vote-national-survey-modern-poll-tax;
Voter
Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Aug.
25, 2020) [hereinafter Voter Identification Requirements], https://www.ncsl.org
/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx; VOPP: Table 12: States with
Postage-Paid Election Mail, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Sept. 14, 2020)
[hereinafter VOPP], https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns
/vopp-table-12-states-with-postage-paid-election-mail.aspx;
David
Thun,
Notarizing Mail-in Ballots: Preparing Notaries for the November 2020 Election,
NAT’L NOTARY BULL. BLOG (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.nationalnotary.org
/notary-bulletin/blog/2020/10/notarizing-mail-in-ballots-preparing-notaries-forthe-november-2020-election.
7
Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 6.
8
VOPP, supra note 6.
9
E.g., Elora Mukherjee, Abolishing the Time Tax on Voting, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2009).
10
Thun, supra note 6.
11
Id.
12
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., supra note 6, at 19–33.
13
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008).
14
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); Norman v. Reed,
502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
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ballot is never an insignificant burden when a voter cannot pay.
More importantly, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was intended to
abolish financial burdens on the franchise broadly—not just the
customary poll tax—which the Court recognized in its expansion of
the Amendment’s application to state elections in Harper.15 Since
Crawford, the Court has failed to recognize the special status of
financial burdens on the franchise and has applied the simple
Anderson-Burdick balancing test to modern poll tax claims, leading
to inconsistent and undemocratic results.16 Congress has the
authority to obviate financial burdens on the franchise with
appropriate legislation under its enforcement powers granted by the
Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments,17 and in fact
attempted to do so when it enacted Section 10 of the Voting Rights
Act (“VRA”), prohibiting poll taxes.18 The Court should disentangle
financial burdens on the ballot from other ordinary election
regulations and return to applying the Harper standard to laws that
place financial burdens on voting rights. If the Court refuses to do
so, Congress should amend Section 10 of the VRA to strengthen its
provisions and restore the Harper test.19 Only then would the call of
Harper––that the wealth of a voter bear no relation to her ability to
vote––be fulfilled.20
This Note argues that modern poll tax jurisprudence has strayed
impermissibly far from Harper and calls for the courts and, more
importantly, lawmakers, to address the present financial barriers to
the free exercise of the fundamental right to vote. Part I surveys the
history of poll taxes from the American Revolution to the
ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964, unpacking
the intended broad scope of the Amendment. Part II traces the
Supreme Court’s approach to poll tax claims and argues that the
Court mistakenly treated de facto poll taxes like ordinary state
15

Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
See New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, No. 1:20-CV-01986-ELR, 2020
WL 5200930, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2020) (holding that Georgia’s failure to
provide pre-paid postage for mail ballots was not an unconstitutional poll tax or
an undue burden).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 2.
18
52 U.S.C. § 10306.
19
Id.
20
Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
16
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election regulations by applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing
test in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.21 Part III
outlines the various financial burdens states have imposed on the
right to vote post-Crawford––especially since the Court invalidated
key provisions of the VRA in Shelby County v. Holder22––and their
impact. Part IV examines the difficulty lower courts have had
applying Anderson-Burdick, particularly when there is a monetary
burden on the ballot. Part V calls for the Court to correct the error
and return to applying strict scrutiny analysis in cases of wealthbased burdens on the ballot, as Harper demanded.23 Further, this
Note calls for Congress to use its enforcement powers under the
Twenty-Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to update Section 10
of the VRA and define a poll tax as any financial barrier placed
between a voter and the ballot.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF POLL TAXES AND THE TWENTYFOURTH AMENDMENT
Historically, the customary poll tax was an annual fee that voters
were required to pay in order to participate in an election.24 Now,
the poll tax is considered unconstitutional under both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment25 and the TwentyFourth Amendment.26 But even in the mid-twentieth century, the
poll tax was a common, albeit controversial, element in American
elections.27

21

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
23
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
24
Some states, like Georgia, went further and required the poll tax to be paid
before registering. Many states required voters to hold onto receipts to show poll
workers before voting on election day. David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v.
Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 388–90 (2011).
25
See Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
27
Partelow, supra note 4, at 428–34.
22
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A. Early History and Jim Crow
While the poll tax is mostly remembered for suppressing black
voters in the Jim Crow south, its origin in American elections began
long before the Reconstruction period.28 Over the course of
American history, the tax has been used to both limit and restrict the
franchise.29 After the American Revolution, many states held on to
the British tradition30 of restricting the franchise to property
owners––specifically white, male property owners––based on the
theory that “owning property showed an investment in the welfare
of the community.”31 Other states expanded access to the franchise
by allowing non-property owners to vote upon payment of a poll
tax,32 effectively broadening the voting population only to white
men who owned property or were sufficiently wealthy. But by the
mid-nineteenth century, nearly all states liberalized voter
qualifications, establishing “universal white male suffrage” and
discontinuing the poll tax.33
After the Civil War and the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment granted black men the right to vote, states reenacted
poll taxes––along with literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and white
primaries––with the explicit intent to keep black voters from the
polls.34 By 1904, every state in the former Confederacy had a poll
tax law on its books.35 While the intent of these poll taxes was
undoubtedly racially motivated,36 class politics were also a
motivating factor.37 The economic interests of poor white farmers
had diverged from those of wealthy white southerners, resulting in
poor white farmers splitting from the Democratic Party to join the

28

Id. at 427–28.
Id. at 427.
30
Schultz & Clark, supra note 24, at 381.
31
Partelow, supra note 4, at 427.
32
Id.
33
Schultz & Clark, supra note 24, at 385.
34
Id. at 386.
35
Partelow, supra note 4, at 428.
36
“[S]tate constitutional conventions of [the reconstruction] era were
explicit about their intention to disenfranchise black voters . . . .” Id. at 430.
37
Id. at 428–29.
29
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Populists.38 That being said, while the poll tax targeted all lowincome voters, it disproportionately impacted and disenfranchised
black voters.39
The cost of the poll tax in the post-Reconstruction south ranged
between $1.00 to $2.00,40 roughly equivalent to at least $32.00 in
2020.41 At the time, the tax was considered a relatively small amount
that had “no appreciable hindrance on voting for the well-todo . . . but created a serious burden for those of low economic
status.”42 Additionally, some states made actual payment
bureaucratically difficult either by making little-to-no effort to
collect the tax or limiting the time when the tax could be paid to
specific, narrow timeframes.43 The tax also accrued over time and
nonpayment one year resulted in a higher fee the following year,44
which meant with each passing year it became harder and more
expensive for individuals to access the ballot.
B. The Path to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Early
Supreme Court Decisions
During the New Deal era of reform, calls to abolish the poll tax
began with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) as a chief
supporter.45 He saw the poll tax as a class issue rather than a civil
rights issue, and called for more liberal Democrats to challenge
southern incumbents supporting––and benefitting from––the poll
tax.46 FDR, however, abandoned his attempts to end the poll tax
after most southern conservative incumbents fought off challengers
38

Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.
40
Partelow, supra note 4, at 431.
41
MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/dollarvaluetoday
/?amount=1.00&from=1900 (last visited Mar. 4, 2021) (insert “1” in the dollar
amount field; then type “1900” in the year field).
42
Partelow, supra note 4, at 431.
43
Id.
44
Id.; Valencia Richardson, Voting While Poor: Reviving the 24th
Amendment and Eliminating the Modern-Day Poll Tax, 27 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 451, 455 (2020).
45
Partelow, supra note 4, at 432–34.
46
Id.
39
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in the 1938 elections and the Supreme Court defended the poll tax
in Breedlove v. Suttles.47
But anti–poll taxers still made progress by passing the Soldier
Vote Act of 1942, which prohibited a poll tax on absentee ballots in
federal elections,48 and by getting the Republican Party to oppose
the poll tax in its 1944 national platform.49 In 1949, an Article V
Constitutional Amendment to abolish the poll tax was first brought
to the Senate floor by Senator Spessard Holland, a Democrat from
Florida.50 He framed the poll tax as a class issue, distinct from the
civil rights movement.51 In fact, Holland was a lifelong
segregationist and supported ending the poll tax in spite of its
customary use to disenfranchise black voters.52 Repeatedly during
the debates in Congress, Holland and other Senators stressed classbased, rather than civil rights–based, justifications for the
Amendment.53 As a result, “many politicians nonetheless supported
it because they believed their poor, white constituents would benefit
from the Amendment.”54
The battle against the poll tax was won in the court of public
opinion long before it succeeded on Capitol Hill. When the
Amendment finally passed Congress in 1962, all but five states had
47

Brendan F. Friedman, The Forgotten Amendment and Voter
Identification: How the New Wave of Voter Identification Laws Violates the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 343, 347 (2013);
Partelow, supra note 4, at 434; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937)
(holding that a Georgia poll tax was constitutional under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments).
48
Partelow, supra note 4, at 434–35.
49
Id. at 435.
50
108 CONG. REC. 2851, 4152 (1962).
51
Friedman, supra note 47, at 365.
52
Partelow, supra note 4, at 435.
53
108 CONG. REC. 4151 (1962) (statement of Senator Russell) (“I have never
been able to understand how poll tax legislation can be called civil rights
legislation.”); 108 CONG. REC. 4154 (1962) (statement of Senator Holland)
(“[T]he proposal does not come under the ordinary classification of the ordinary
civil rights legislation. It applies to majorities, to minorities, and to every person
of every color.”); 108 CONG. REC. 4585 (1962) (statement of Senator Yarborough)
(“I think [the poll tax] has unjustly discriminated against the people of limited
means.”).
54
Friedman, supra note 47, at 366.
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already ended the poll tax and the Amendment was “relatively
uncontroversial.”55 It was quickly ratified and added to the
Constitution in 1964.56 It provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in
any primary or other election for President or Vice
President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any state by reason of failure to pay
any poll tax or other tax.57
Like the other voting amendments, there is also a second section
which reads: “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.”58
It has been argued that the legislative history59 and the text of
the Amendment both express an intent to abolish all financial
burdens on the franchise—not only customary poll taxes.60 In
particular, as Chief Justice Warren explained in the only Supreme
Court decision interpreting the Amendment,61 the language “denied
or abridged” points to a broader prohibition than direct denial of the

55

Partelow, supra note 4, at 436–37.
Friedman, supra note 47, at 349.
57
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
58
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 2.
59
108 CONG. REC. 17,657 (1962) (statement of Rep. Fascell) (“[T]he
payment of money, whether directly or indirectly, whether in a small amount or
in a large amount, should never be permitted to reign as a criterion of democracy.
There should not be allowed a scintilla of this in our free society.”); 108 CONG.
REC. 17,660 (1962) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (“No person should have to pay
for the privilege of voting.”); 108 CONG. REC. 17,665 (1962) (statement of Rep.
Addabbo) (“I believe it is our responsibility to at least give to all those qualified
to vote the right to do so without having to pay for that right and to continue to
work for the moral rights of all.”); 108 CONG. REC. 17,665 (1962) (statement of
Rep. Dingell) (supporting the Twenty-Fourth Amendment because “[i]t prohibits
other taxes being used as a device to evade the legislative purpose of the
amendment”); 108 CONG. REC. 17,666 (1962) (statement of Rep. Boland)
(“[T]here should not be any price tag or any kind of tax on the right to vote. For
some people this financial imposition may be enough to discourage participation
in the electoral process.”).
60
E.g., Friedman, supra note 47, at 364–68.
61
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540–41 (1965).
56
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ballot for failure to pay.62 Additionally, the inclusion of “or other
tax” also signals broad application to financial burdens on the
franchise.63 In short, “[t]he broader purpose of the Twenty-fourth
Amendment thus should be read as a rejection of this linkage
between wealth and voting . . . and should be interpreted to
prohibit . . . practices that deny voting and voting-related activities
due to wealth-based burdens.”64 As President Johnson exalted at the
certification signing of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, “there can
be no one too poor to vote.”65
Just over one year later, Congress enacted the historic and hardfought Voting Rights Act of 1965.66 The Act provided sweeping
voting rights protections and intended to protect Black voters’
access to the ballot.67 In addition to abolishing literacy tests68 and
requiring certain jurisdictions to seek preapproval for new voting
laws,69 the Act doubled down on the abolition of the poll tax.70
Section 10 of the Act––a little-known and rarely-used provision––
adds a statutory remedy against poll taxes, grants the U.S. Attorney
General enforcement authority,71 and provides an implied private
right of action.72

62

Friedman, supra note 47, at 367.
Id. at 367–68; Schultz & Clark, supra note 24, at 416–17 (citing Allison
Hayward, What Is an Unconstitutional “Other Tax” on Voting? Construing the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 23 ELECTION L.J. 103, 117 (2008)).
64
Schultz & Clark, supra note 24, at 377. See also Friedman, supra note 47,
at 364–68; Partelow, supra note 4, at 454–59.
65
Friedman, supra note 47, at 349.
66
Erin Blakemore, How the U.S. Voting Rights Act Was Won—and Why It’s
Under Fire Today, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.national
geographic.com/history/reference/united-states-history/history-voting-rightsact/#close.
67
Id.
68
52 U.S.C. § 10303.
69
Id. § 10304.
70
Id. § 10306.
71
Id.
72
Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230–34 (1996) (holding
that Section 10, like Section 5 of the VRA, provides an implied private right of
action).
63
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II. EVOLUTION OF POLL TAX JURISPRUDENCE
The foundational poll tax cases invalidated customary poll taxes
in the 1960s and set forth the test for eliminating monetary burdens
on the ballot. Later in the twentieth century, a distinct line of ballot
access cases established the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, and
in the Supreme Court’s most recent decision concerning a state law
that imposes financial burdens on voters, it merged the poll tax cases
with Anderson-Burdick jurisprudence.
A. The Foundational Poll Tax Cases: Harman and Harper
Since ratification, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment has only once
been directly applied by the Supreme Court, in Harman v.
Forsennius, which struck down Virginia’s annual $1.50 poll tax to
participate in federal elections.73 The Court explained that the
Amendment does “not merely insure that the franchise shall not be
‘denied’ by reason of failure to pay the poll tax; it expressly
guarantees that the right to vote shall not be ‘denied or abridged’ for
that reason.”74 Moreover, the Court notes that the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, like the Fifteenth Amendment, “nullifies sophisticated
as well as simple-minded modes of impairing the right
guaranteed.”75 For plaintiffs to show that a restriction violated the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned, they must
demonstrate “that [the restriction] imposes a material requirement
solely upon those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right
to vote in federal elections without paying a poll tax.”76 However,
this test was never successfully used by the Court, because one year
after Harman, the Court issued its decision in Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, forever shifting poll tax jurisprudence
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.77

73
74
75
76
77

Partelow, supra note 4, at 437.
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965).
Id. at 540–41 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 541.
Partelow, supra note 4, at 439.
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In Harper, Virginia’s poll tax was at issue again, although this
time the Court considered its use in state elections.78 The Court
found an implied right to participate in state elections and held that
conditioning that right on payment of a tax was unconstitutional.79
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas quoted Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, an early Equal Protection case, and noted, “‘the political
franchise of voting’ [is] a ‘fundamental political right, because [it
is] preservative of all rights.’”80 This statement effectively situated
the right to vote among other fundamental rights which receive
heightened constitutional protection.81 Accordingly, the Court ruled
that strict scrutiny should apply and concluded that “the interest of
the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix
qualifications,”82 and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states
from setting voter qualifications that “invidiously discriminate.”83
B. Ballot Access Cases: The Anderson-Burdick Balancing
Test
Following Harper, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis84 to
all voting rights cases––not just cases involving financial burdens
78

Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
Id. at 666–67.
80
Id. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
81
Id. The Court has often repeated Harper’s assertion that voting is a
fundamental political right. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983) (“[T]hese rights of voters are fundamental . . . .”); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 105 (2000) (holding that the recount mechanisms in Florida did not meet the
requirements for “treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right”).
82
Harper, 383 U.S. at 666–70. While the Court does not use the term strict
scrutiny, it is widely recognized that the standard the Court applies in Harper is
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter
Defrauded? Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009); Kelly E. Brilleaux, The Right, the Test,
and the Vote: Evaluating the Reasoning Employed in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, 70 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1030 n. 50 (2010); Friedman, supra note
47, at 370.
83
Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
84
Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of scrutiny, typically applied to
Equal Protection claims concerning suspect classes or fundamental rights. Under
strict scrutiny the government bears the burden of proving that the challenged law
79
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on voters––and invalidated voting regulations that were not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.85 The Court
even applied Harper to strike down a Texas ballot access law that
required candidates pay a fee to appear on the ballot, reasoning that
“the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselves to neat separation,” and a candidate’s ability to pay the
fee depended on the wealth of her supporters.86
But the “carefully constructed framework began to fray”87 in
1983 when the Court decided Anderson v. Celebrezze, a case
predominately concerning ballot access.88 In Anderson, the Court
evaluated whether an Ohio law requiring independent candidates for
president to file their petitions early placed an “unconstitutional
burden on the voting and associational rights of Anderson’s
supporters.”89 Finding that there is no “neat separation” between the
rights of voters and candidates, the Court developed a balancing
test.90 It held that when reviewing a challenge to a state election law
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
a court must first consider the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength
of each of those interests; it also must consider the
furthers a compelling state interest and that the law is narrowly tailored to further
that interest. PRACTICAL LAW GOV’T PRACTICE, SECTION 1983: EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAIMS (2021), Westlaw Practical Law Practice Note W-002-6708.
85
In two Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s related to residency
requirements––Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) and Marston v. Lewis,
410 U.S. 679 (1973)––the Court used the Harper strict scrutiny analysis to
consider a state voting regulation purportedly designed to prevent voter fraud.
Benson, supra note 82, at 13–14.
86
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
87
Benson, supra note 82, at 14.
88
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
89
Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
90
Id. at 786 (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143).
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extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all
these factors is the reviewing court in a position to
decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.91
The Court relied on prior “ballot access cases”92 to support this
standard, not voting rights cases.93 Applying the balancing test, the
Court found the burdens placed on Ohio’s “independent-minded
voters”94 were severe and therefore outweighed the state’s
“minimal” interest.95 Unfortunately, “[e]ven though the facts of
Anderson dealt with . . . ballot access, the open-ended language of
its new balancing test allowed for varying applications with regard
to voting in subsequent jurisprudence.”96
Almost a decade later, the Court relaxed the Anderson test and
continued to drift from the exacting scrutiny called for in Harper. In
Burdick v. Takushi, the Court sided with the State of Hawaii,
rejecting a constitutional challenge to a law that prohibited write-in
voting.97 Before undertaking the Anderson analysis, the Court
signaled it was employing a weakened standard when it stated, “‘[i]t
is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most fundamental significance
under our constitutional structure.’ It does not follow, however, that
the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for political
purposes through the ballot are absolute.”98 The Court rejected the
petitioner’s claim that the case concerned voting rights rather than
ballot access, but acknowledged that every election regulation
91
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97
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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places some burdens on voters and that there is no rigid line between
ballot access and voting rights cases.99 Based off that reasoning, the
Court claimed “[t]he appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that
a state law burdens the right to vote is set forth in Anderson.”100
Under this “more flexible standard,”101 a court may give greater
consideration to a state’s interest but may, as it did in Burdick,
uphold a regulation that imposes “minimal” burdens on a voter’s
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.102
C. Applying Anderson-Burdick to Voting Rights: Crawford
v. Marion County
The expansion of the test in Burdick set the stage for the
Supreme Court’s controversial opinion in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, “prov[ing] to be the [Anderson-Burdick]
test’s most expansive and far reaching application to date.”103 At
issue in Crawford was a strict Indiana voter ID law passed by its
legislature in 2005, which required voters to “provide proof of
identification . . . before being permitted to sign the poll list . . . .”104
For proof of identification to be accepted, the law required it to
include a photo of the individual105 and be issued by the state of
Indiana or the federal government.106
The suit was brought on behalf of “disabled, poor, and elderly
voters”107 who could not afford a birth certificate and were required
to travel to the clerk’s office to validate their provisional ballot
within days of voting.108 The suit raised a number of claims,
including a Twenty-Fourth Amendment claim which the Court did
99
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103
Brilleaux, supra note 82, at 1034.
104
IND. CODE ANN. § 3-10-1-7.2 (West 2006).
105
Id. § 3-5-2-40.5(2) (West 2006).
106
Id. § 3-5-2-40.5(4) (West 2006).
107
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187 (2008).
108
Id. at 200.
100

FREEING POLL TAXES FROM ANDERSON-BURDICK 537
not consider.109 However, the Court did evaluate whether the law
was a burden on Indiana voters’ rights inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment, and a majority110 of the justices upheld the
law, finding that the financial burden the voter ID law placed on
voters was not severe, though there was no majority opinion.111
While the plurality and concurrence disagreed on how to apply
the Anderson-Burdick test, both believed that it, rather than Harper,
was the proper standard to apply.112 The plurality began the opinion
affirming the fundamental nature of the right to vote and discussing
Harper.113 It noted that, “under the standard applied in Harper, even
rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are
unrelated to voter qualifications.”114 Additionally, it recognized that
Harper requires even “slight” burdens to be supported by
“legitimate state interests” that are “sufficiently weighty to justify
the limitation” in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.115
The plurality then undertook the Anderson-Burdick analysis and
dug into the state’s asserted interest of preventing voter fraud “with
less skepticism than did the Court in Anderson.”116 In fact, it noted
that “the record contain[ed] no evidence of any [in-person voter]
fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history”117 but
still found that “[t]here is no question about the legitimacy or
importance of the State’s interest.”118 Ultimately, the Court found
that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of persuasion,119 in part
because the factual record was inadequate to show the nature of the
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burden on voters.120 Thus those burdens, it reasoned, including
monetary burdens, derived more from “life’s vagaries” and were not
serious or frequent enough to outweigh the state’s interest.121
Nonetheless, the plurality left breadcrumbs indicating that this was
a close case, noting that voters’ ability to cast a provisional ballot as
well as obtain a free ID from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles
mitigated constitutional concerns.122
After Crawford, strict voter identification laws were enacted in
at least fourteen states between 2009 and 2013.123 The trend of states
enacting new, heightened voting restrictions accelerated after
2013124 when the Court in Shelby County v. Holder invalidated the
preclearance regime of the VRA.125 The new heightened restrictions
include voter identification requirements, voter purges, polling
place closures, cutbacks to early voting, and other policies that
suppress the vote.126 Unfortunately, voting is becoming more
challenging and more expensive for American voters.127
III. WEALTH-BASED BURDENS AND THEIR IMPACT
In Crawford, the plurality focused attention on the plaintiffs’
proof problems, questioning whether any voters were actually
120
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CTR. FOR JUST. (June 25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work
/analysis-opinion/voting-rights-america-six-years-after-shelby-v-holder.
127
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ISSUES RELATED TO STATE
VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670
/665965.pdf; Quan Li et al., Cost of Voting in the American States, 17 (No. 3)
ELECTION L.J. 234 (2018), http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2017.0478.
121

FREEING POLL TAXES FROM ANDERSON-BURDICK 539
burdened by the voter ID law.128 Since that decision in 2008, as more
states have enacted restrictive election laws129 and more social
science research has been dedicated to the issue,130 the degree of the
problem has become more apparent.
A. Low-Income Voter Participation
Low-income eligible voters participate in elections at
consistently lower rates than middle-class and wealthy
Americans.131 According to a 2020 study conducted by the Poor
People’s Campaign and Columbia University, low-income132
eligible voters are 22% less likely to vote in national elections
compared to higher-income eligible voters.133 The trend holds in
midterm and presidential election cycles, with turnout consistently
dipping about 10% across all income groups in midterm years.134
Additionally, analysis of Census data from the 2016 election shows
that lower household income is directly correlated with low voter
turnout rate.135 Low-income non-voters are a large and potentially
powerful voting group nationwide; in many states they would
represent over 20% of the electorate.136
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While low-income eligible voters are not a political monolith,137
their disproportionate lack of participation means they are
consistently underrepresented in government.138 And despite claims
that low-income voters carried Donald Trump to the White House
in 2016,139 “President Trump did not win the votes of most lowincome voters.”140 In actuality, just a 5% increase in low-income
voter participation would have been the margin of victory in the
2016 presidential election and could have changed its result.141
While early reports indicate that low-income voters participated at a
higher rate in the 2020 election,142 it is unclear how much of the
increase is due to non-voters showing up at the polls versus an
overall increase in the number of Americans struggling financially
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.143 But the fact that lowincome voters do not overwhelmingly support one political party144
provides political motivation for both Democrat and Republican
legislators to support policies that make it easier for low-income
voters to participate.
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Interestingly, low-income eligible non-voters say they choose
not to vote because they are dissatisfied with the candidates or the
electoral process at the same rate as higher income non-voters.145
Low-income eligible voters, however, more often cite transportation
problems and illness or disability as the reason they did not
vote.146Additionally, a slightly higher rate of low-income voters
chose to vote in-person in the 2016 election rather than by mail.147
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, many states have broadened
access to mail voting148 and a historic number of voters opted to vote
by mail,149 but it remains to be seen whether low-income voters took
advantage of mail voting in the 2020 election more than they did in
previous elections.150
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B. Rush of Restrictive Election Regulations Post-Shelby
County

Prior to the Shelby County decision in 2013,151 Section 5 of the
VRA required certain states to submit election regulations to the
Department of Justice for approval before they could be enacted.152
Through the Act’s coverage formula, Section 5’s preclearance
regime applied to states and localities that had a history of
discriminatory voting practices.153 The Department of Justice
reviewed whether the regulations had a retrogressive discriminatory
purpose or effect.154 The preclearance regime was regarded as
wildly successful at proactively preventing injuries to the right to
vote.155 From 1965 to 2013, the law struck down restrictive election
laws including reapportionment plans, cutbacks to early voting
periods, and voter ID requirements.156
Immediately after the Shelby County decision struck down the
preclearance regime, states that had been subjected to preapproval
took the opportunity to enact regulations that were previously
blocked or deterred by the VRA.157 In North Carolina, the legislature
moved to pass an omnibus package of voting restrictions the very
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next day.158 In Texas, hours after the Shelby County decision, the
Governor announced that a strict photo voter ID law, previously
blocked by the VRA, would take effect.159 By the 2016 election, the
first presidential election without the full protection of the VRA,
fourteen states had enacted new restrictive voting laws.160
New restrictive election rules were enacted under the guise of
factors like partisanship,161 promoting voter confidence, or fraud
prevention.162 These restrictions took varying shapes and targeted
both registration and voting processes.163 Florida, Virginia, and
Iowa undertook voter purges that targeted alleged “non-citizens” on
the rolls.164 The names on the voter rolls were compared with the
Department of Homeland Security’s Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlements (“SAVE”) database, which has been criticized as
faulty and particularly flawed for election administration use.165 The
practice resulted in the disproportionate disenfranchisement of
Hispanic voters.166 In North Carolina, the state eradicated same-day
voter registration, shortened early voting, and restricted when
provisional ballots could be counted.167 Ohio similarly cut back its
early voting days, crucially ending “golden week”––the one week

158

Jedediah Purdy, A Voting-Rights Victory in North Carolina, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-votingrights-victory-in-north-carolina.
159
The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 157.
160
Election 2016: Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/election-2016-restrictive-voting-laws-numbers#section5.
161
N.C. St. Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016)
(discussing the state’s argument that the law intentionally discriminated against
Democrats, not racial minorities).
162
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing the
state’s argument that the law was enacted to “prevent in-person voter fraud and
increase voter confidence and turnout”).
163
Lee, supra note 156.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Purdy, supra note 158.

544

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

period when voters could register and vote at the same time.168
Georgia, Texas, and Arizona have closed hundreds of polling places
since the Shelby County decision, disproportionately in minority and
low-income neighborhoods.169 While some of these new election
regulations have been challenged and struck down by federal and
state courts, many still remain in effect.170
One of the most popular voting restrictions post–Shelby County
is voter ID. These laws generally require that voters show a
government-issued ID in order to vote in person at a polling place.171
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, thirtysix states have a voter ID law on their books.172 Prior to enacting
voter ID policies, most states used other methods, like a signature
check, to verify the identity of voters at the polling place.173
Voter ID laws are often described as “strict” or “non-strict.”174
States with strict voter ID laws require presentation of an ID in order
to vote, and if a voter does not show the required ID, they must vote
with a provisional ballot.175 Provisional ballots are a specific type of
ballot given to voters whose eligibility cannot be verified176 and they
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are “often not counted” because voters must follow up and verify
their vote.177 Non-strict voter ID states allow “at least some voters”
without a required ID to cast a ballot that does not require any
follow-up.178 Whether a photo is required on the ID varies from state
to state, regardless of whether the state is a strict or non-strict voter
ID state.179 Nine states have strict voter ID laws, and six of those
states require photo ID. Strict ID laws have been challenged with
varied success,180 and many states changed from strict ID policies to
non-strict ID policies after courts and scholars raised concern about
the constitutionality of strict ID laws.181 To date, the Supreme Court
has declined opportunities to take up the question of voter ID laws
since Crawford.182
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While some states have taken steps to restrict access to the
ballot, others have made moves to expand access to the franchise.183
Many states have made adjustments to their election administration
rules due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including broadening access
to mail voting and establishing drop boxes to deal with the volume
of mail ballots.184 But even though states have made voting by mail
and early voting more accessible during the pandemic, barriers and
burdens remain. For instance, while more voters were able to (and
chose to) vote by mail in 2020 than ever before,185 four states
continued to enforce witness or notary requirements on their mail
ballots,186 including South Carolina, whose witness requirement was
enjoined by a district court and later restored by the Supreme Court
after mail voting had started.187 Additionally, only seventeen states
provide voters with postage-paid envelopes for mail ballots,
meaning that voters in the other states must pay to send their ballot
in.188 Many states permitted drop boxes to help voters ensure their
ballots were delivered on time and provide a workaround for the
183
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postage.189 But not all states did,190 and even those that did often
provided a limited number of drop-off sites.191
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, many states had taken
major strides over the last twenty years to relax or abolish felon
disenfranchisement laws.192 Florida voters made headlines in 2018
when they overwhelmingly passed an amendment to the state’s
constitution restoring the right to vote to most individuals convicted
of a felony.193 Following the amendment’s passage, however, the
Republican state legislature enacted a law to “clarify” it.194 The new
law mandates that felons in Florida pay off all Legal Financial
Obligations (“LFOs”)195 before they are eligible for a restoration of
voting rights, severely limiting the impact of the amendment.196
Many have called this bill a modern-day poll tax because it directly
conditions the right to vote on one’s ability to pay a fee.197
Unfortunately, it is common for states to condition an individual’s
eligibility for rights restoration on payment of LFOs, or completion
of a full sentence, which often includes payment of LFOs.198
189
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Additionally, these claims fall under the line of jurisprudence about
felon disenfranchisement199 and courts have held that states can
discriminate on the basis of wealth when restoring a felon’s right to
vote.200
C. Monetary Burdens Imposed by Restrictive Election
Regulations
While the Court recognized in Burdick that all election
regulations impose some burden on voters,201 not all impose
monetary costs. Some scholars have broadly construed the costs of
these restrictions in terms of their social impact,202 but it may be
more helpful to think of financial burdens on the ballot as either
direct or indirect monetary costs.
Direct financial burdens on the vote are those which require
voters to pay some amount to register, access the ballot, or have their
ballot counted.203 Because they generally require a specific transfer
of money, they are the easiest to quantify. These types of monetary
burdens on the ballot are the most constitutionally suspect and
present the strongest case for invalidation as a poll tax;204 however
few have been successfully challenged.205 They include: states that
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require voters to pay the postage on mail ballots and ballot request
forms;206 states that require mail ballots to be notarized and do not
statutorily prohibit notaries from charging a fee;207 and states that
condition criminal voting rights restoration on payment of all
LFOs.208 States with strict voter ID laws that charge a fee to obtain
qualifying IDs would also fall in this category; however, the
language in Crawford209 and strategic litigation has pushed states to
provide a free ID to at least some voters.210
Indirect financial burdens, on the other hand, are burdens that do
not appear to cost voters money, but that actually do––often due to
lost wages.211 These burdens are more insidious and harder to
quantify, but still have real financial consequences for voters.212
These include: long wait times at polling places,213 especially in
v. Ziriax, No. 20-CV-211-JED-JFJ, 2020 WL 5569576, at *22 (N.D. Okla. Sept.
17, 2020).
206
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207
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states with limited or no time-off-to-vote statutes;214 states with
strict voter ID laws that charge a fee to obtain the documents needed
to apply for an ID card;215 and states that require a witness sign mail
ballots.216 The plurality in Crawford said that these burdens are due
to “life’s vagaries” and are less constitutionally suspect;217 however,
social science research indicates that these policies may be the
reason some voters do not cast a ballot.218
IV. RECENT CHALLENGES AND APPLICATIONS OF ANDERSONBURDICK
Since Crawford and Shelby County, restrictive election laws
have been challenged with mixed success.219 Post–Shelby County,
the most reliable way to invalidate a restrictive election law is to
prove that the law was enacted with racially discriminatory intent in

214

See State Laws on Voting Rights/Time Off to Vote, WORKPLACE
FAIRNESS, https://www.workplacefairness.org/voting-rights-time-off-work (last
visited Nov. 20, 2020).
215
“Indiana counties charge anywhere from $3 to $12 for a birth certificate
(and in some other States the fee is significantly higher), and that same price must
usually be paid for a first-time passport, since a birth certificate is required to
prove U.S. citizenship by birth. The total fees for a passport, moreover, are up to
about $100. So, most voters must pay at least one fee to get the ID necessary to
cast a regular ballot.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 215–
16 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
216
Alabama, Alaska, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin election codes require that mail ballots
be signed by a witness in order to be accepted. VOPP: Table 14: How States Verify
Voted Absentee Ballots, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-14-how-statesverify-voted-absentee.aspx.
217
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197.
218
U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 127.
219
Compare N.C. St. Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 219 (4th
Cir. 2016) (holding that North Carolina’s restrictive election reform package
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2
of the VRA because it was enacted with racially discriminatory intent), with
Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that Texas’ revised
voter ID law was not discriminatory, reversing the district court decision).

FREEING POLL TAXES FROM ANDERSON-BURDICK 551
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.220
Unfortunately, proving racially discriminatory intent is difficult
since courts rarely accept statistical showings of disparate impact221
as evidence, and because state legislatures often use coded language
to hide the racial motivations behind an offending law.222
Against this backdrop, the value of Harper’s determination that
the right to vote is “too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned” is evident.223 Challenging a law because it unduly
burdens the fundamental right to vote does not require proving
discriminatory purpose or intent, instead plaintiffs only need to
show that the state has placed an obstacle in between the voter and
the ballot.224 As mentioned previously, under Harper, once a voter
demonstrated that there was a burden, courts applied strict
scrutiny.225 But now, under the Anderson-Burdick sliding scale test,
a voter must show that the burden is severe to trigger strict
scrutiny.226 While the Court did not clearly evaluate the nature of
the burden in Crawford, the decision effectively raised the burden
of proof and made it harder for plaintiffs to reach strict scrutiny.227
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A. Inconsistent Applications of Anderson-Burdick

The Court has not clarified Anderson-Burdick since Crawford
and lower courts have struggled to apply the test,228 leading many to
disparage it as indeterminate.229 The Sixth Circuit recently criticized
the test and even questioned whether it should be used in Equal
Protection voting rights cases, claiming it asked courts to engage in
“legal gymnastics” to evaluate the burdens on voters.230 In a
different case, the Sixth Circuit bemoaned the test’s lack of
guidelines and reliance on “a judge’s subjective determination.”231
Additionally, Marc Elias, the renowned election attorney for
national Democratic campaign committees, tweeted that the
balancing test is why “[w]e need a new voting rights
jurisprudence.”232 Applications of the test have been so inconsistent
that one election law expert noted, “litigants’ hopes should not ride
on a federal court coming to the rescue under this doctrine.”233
For example, consider the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Obama for
America v. Husted, which held that Ohio’s shortened early vote
period in the 2012 election presented a “particularly high” burden
on voters and was unconstitutional.234 Importantly, the district court
found that the burden was not mitigated by the availability of
alternatives––like mail voting, other early voting days, or election
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day voting235––and the Sixth Circuit held that finding was not
clearly erroneous.236
On the other hand, in Texas LULAC v. Hughs the Fifth Circuit
found the availability of voting alternatives did mitigate the burden
and reversed the district court’s injunction.237 The case concerned
Governor Abbott’s proclamations permitting voters to return their
mail ballots in-person during the entire early voting period, due to
the COVID-19 pandemic.238 County election officials were allowed
to set up drop boxes for ballot collection, but when populous
counties announced multiple drop boxes, Governor Abbott issued a
one drop box per county rule.239 In direct contrast to Obama for
America, the Fifth Circuit found that the overall effect of the
Governor’s proclamations was to expand access—and because
voters could still cast their ballot in-person or by mail, the drop box
limit was only “a de minimis burden.”240
B. Monetary Burdens Under Anderson-Burdick
Even in the 2020 election litigation, when some courts were
willing to take the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic into
consideration when weighing burdens on voters,241 challenges to
direct monetary burdens on the vote were largely unsuccessful under
Anderson-Burdick.242 The pandemic pushed a historic number of
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voters to vote by mail in the 2020 election,243 and some voters and
progressive organizations challenged states’ failure to pre-pay
postage on ballots or ballot requests as an unconstitutional financial
burden on the vote.244 Some states negotiated settlements on the
issue.245 But in the few cases where the issue was considered on the
merits, courts were largely unsympathetic––finding that the burden
was not severe enough to require strict scrutiny or that voters had
no-cost alternatives for returning their ballot.246
In Georgia, two suits specifically challenged the postage issue:
Black Voters Matter Fund v. Raffensperger247 and New Georgia
Project v. Raffensperger, but the latter was decided after the Black
Voters Matter case and deferred to its reasoning.248 Plaintiffs
claimed the pandemic made voting by mail the only “meaningful
option” for most voters and the postage requirement imposed an
unavoidable monetary burden on the franchise.249 The court
disagreed, reasoning under Anderson-Burdick that the burden was
only moderate and was mitigated by no-cost alternatives like voting
in person, dropping off the ballot at a drop box, or delivering the
ballot to the county elections office.250 The court also emphasized
the public health measures the state had taken to facilitate safe inperson voting as evidence that these alternatives to mail voting were
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viable.251 Moreover, the court found that the plaintiffs’ burdens did
not outweigh the state’s legitimate interest in fiscal
responsibility252––running counter to Harman.253
Democratic Party organizations in Oklahoma brought a virtually
identical claim in DCCC v. Ziriax, and the district court rejected it
with scant reasoning.254 The court there acknowledged the Georgia
decisions but did not argue that alternatives mitigate the monetary
burden of voter-provided postage.255 Instead, the court pointed to the
lack of evidence that voters were burdened and claimed that postage
is the kind of “usual burden on voting” that Crawford permits.256
These decisions demonstrate the weakness of constitutional
protections against monetary burdens on the vote under AndersonBurdick and how far courts have strayed from the protections that
Harper, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and Section 10 of the VRA
were meant to provide. The notion that plaintiffs must show that a
monetary burden on the vote is severe to receive relief from a court
cannot be reconciled with Harper.257 Under Harper, the real issue is
whether voters must pay to get a ballot, not whether voters are able
to pay the price.258 Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a fee is
necessary to vote, Harper requires courts to open the door to strict
scrutiny.259 Instead, under Anderson-Burdick, the court refuses relief
unless plaintiffs provide specific evidence that voters cannot pay
and gives deference to proffered state interests, seldom evaluating
whether the interest is actually served by the financial burden.260
251
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
By using the Anderson-Burdick test to evaluate monetary
burdens on the ballot in Crawford, the Court weakened the
constitutional protections for the right to vote in an area where
Congress,261 the majority of the states,262 and even the Court had
explicitly sought to bolster protection.263 Both the Court and
Congress should take action to restore the strong constitutional
command against de facto poll taxes and disentangle financial
burdens on the ballot from other ordinary election regulations. Until
such action is taken, the call of Harper––that wealth bears no
relation to voting qualifications––will not be fulfilled.264
First, the Court can address this problem by realigning de facto
poll tax cases under Harper, rather than Anderson-Burdick. Due to
Anderson-Burdick’s inconsistent applications and general
unpredictability, many have called for the test to be clarified and
reigned in,265 and this need has become only more urgent after the
COVID-19 pandemic election litigation shined a spotlight on the
test’s problems.266 The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a
de facto poll tax case that presents a direct financial burden on
voters, like Black Voters Matter Fund, and use the case to clarify
that monetary burdens on the vote are special and should therefore
be considered under Harper rather than Anderson-Burdick. The
Court should rest this claim on the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s
text and legislative history which indicate the Amendment was
meant to protect voters from financial burdens on the ballot beyond
the customary poll tax;267 Congress’ clear intent to double down on
the elimination of poll taxes in Section 10 of the VRA;268 and the
Court’s expansion of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in Harper,
which went beyond striking down Virginia’s poll tax to declare that
“wealth or fee-paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications;
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
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the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened
or conditioned.”269
Additionally, Congress should use its enforcement authority
under the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments270 to revise
Section 10 of the VRA to explicitly broaden its applicability and
realign monetary burdens under Harper.271 Section 10 is an underutilized portion of the VRA that prohibits poll taxes and largely
codifies the constitutional standard.272 Congress, however, should
strengthen this provision by amending the statute in two ways. First,
it should define poll taxes to include not only customary poll taxes,
but also de facto poll taxes. Put another way, Congress should
expand the definition to cover and eliminate all monetary burdens
on the vote. To do this, Congress would need to find that all financial
burdens, not just customary poll taxes, prevent low-income potential
voters from exercising the franchise.273 As explained in part III,
ample evidence exists to support this finding and, from a practical
political perspective, there is ample motivation on both sides of the
aisle to bolster the protections for low-income voters because they
are not a monolithic voting bloc.274
Second, Congress should statutorily correct the Supreme
Court’s course and require courts to review monetary burdens on the
vote using the Harper test rather than Anderson-Burdick for claims
brought under Section 10. This approach is not unprecedented; in
fact, in 1982 Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to overturn a
problematic Supreme Court decision on reapportionment.275
Congress could either statutorily require the Harper strict scrutiny
standard276 or shift the burden of proof onto the state when a plaintiff
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claims, under Section 10, that her vote has been financially
burdened.
If Congress made either (or both) of these proposed changes to
Section 10, the door would likely open for more plaintiffs to
challenge direct and indirect de facto poll taxes, despite hard-toquantify burdens, and states would be required to provide more than
mere pretext for their interest behind a restrictive and financially
burdensome election law. In other words, it would be one significant
step toward a stronger constitutional protection of the right to vote.
CONCLUSION
By tracing poll tax jurisprudence from its origin to its modern
state, it is clear that the condemnation of wealth-based burdens on
the ballot established by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, Harper,
and Section 10 of the VRA has not been recognized.277 The Court in
Harper held that states cannot require voters to pay for access to the
ballot,278 yet many voters still must expend financial resources to get
to the ballot box, either directly or indirectly. When the Court uses
Anderson-Burdick to analyze monetary burdens on the vote it
focuses on whether voters are able to pay the price, disregarding the
fundamental nature of the right to vote279 and the special protections
against financial burdens on the ballot.280 The Court and Congress
must take action to affirm the special status of monetary burdens on
the vote and untangle de facto poll taxes from the ordinary election
regulations subject to Anderson-Burdick. Only then would the full
promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment be realized, because
“there [should] be no one too poor to vote.”281

277

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; Harper, 383 U.S. at 670; 52 U.S.C.
§ 10306.
278
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
279
Id.
280
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; Harper, 383 U.S. at 670; 52 U.S.C.
§ 10306.
281
Nan Robertson, 24th Amendment Becomes Official, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1964, at 14.

